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----------00000----------
SHARON M. DAVIS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Case No. 18077 
v. 
CHARLES FRANCIS DAVIS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
----------00000----------
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a divorce case. Respondent filed a Complaint 
seeking, among other things, an award of the parties' 
residence; one-half of the value of certain New Mexico 
property; alimony; an order requiring the Respondent to assume 
all debts of the marriage with the exception of the first 
mortgage on the residence; and attorney's fees. Appellant 
answered and counterclaimed seeking, .among other things, 
one-half of the equity in the home, an award of the New Mexico 
property, an equitable distribution of the personal property 
and an order requiring each party to bear their own debts, 
obligations and attorney's fees. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to the Honorable G. Hal Taylor and, 
after the evidence was received, the Court granted Respondent a 
Decree of Divorce. The Court took the issues of support and 
the distribution of the marital property under advisement and 
- each of the parties submitted Briefs in support of their 
respective positions. The Trial Court then awarded Respondent 
the use of the marital residence subject to an $11,500.00 lien 
in favor of the Appellant with Respondent to pay the first 
and second mortgage payments. The Court ordered the New Mexico 
property sold and the net proceeds divided between the parties, 
one-third to Respondent and two-thirds to Appellant. The Court 
ordered Appellant to pay to the Respondent $420.00 per month 
alimony to continue until the second mortgage on the residence 
had been paid in full. The Court distributed the debts and 
personal property of the parties and awarded Respondent 
$1,000.00 attorney's fees. Appellant objected to the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Court heard 
argument on those objections. It modified the Decree of 
Divorce clarifying certain conditions which would cause the 
Appellant's lien on the residence to become due; affirmed its 
Decision calling for the sale of the New Mexico property; and, 
reaffirmed all remaining particulars of the Memorandum 
Decision. No Motion for New Trial was filed. 
2 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the Decree of Divorce, 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Order on 
Defendant's Objections in all particulars and an award of her 
costs incurred in connection with this Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant has made certain omissions in his Statement of 
Facts and Respondent feels it is necessary to more accurately 
set forth the facts as found by the Trial Court and as are 
supported by the record. 
The parties were married on March 5, 1974 and separated on 
May 15, 1980. (R-93) Respondent gave up a $150.00 per month 
alimony award from a previous divorce when she married 
Appellant. (R-140) Throughout the six-year marriage, 
Appellant worked as a truck driver and, at the time of trial, 
was grossing approximately $27,000.00 per year. (R-163) 
Respondent was working at the time of the marriage, but quit at 
the request of Appellant. (R-156) However, she did work 
during the marriage (R-156) and, at the time of trial, was 
earning $687.38 net per month. (R-95) During the marriage, 
the parties worked together and jointly contributed money, time 
and effort to the maintenance of the household. (R-130, 146). 
Respondent brought certain furniture into the marriage 
which Appellant directed be disposed of because of its 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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connection with Respondent's former husband. (R-203) She also 
had a 1974 Gran Torino which Appellant sold. The proceeds were 
then used for family purposes. (R-130) Appellant also brought 
some furniture into the marriage and a 1967 Oldsmobile which 
Respondent was allowed to use. 
Respondent also brought a personal residence into the 
marriage subject to an $18,210.00 mortgage. (R-22, 117) The 
parties used this home during the marriage. The monthly 
payment on the first mortgage is $195.00 and presently has a 
balance of $14,421.90. (R-94, 95) Shortly before separation, 
a second mortgage was taken on the home and its balance at the 
time of trial was $15,876.27 with monthly payments of $345.00. 
(R-94-95) Appellant had made the monthly second mortgage 
payments from the time the parties separated to the time of 
trial. (R-141, 164) There was a conflict in the testimony of 
the parties as to how much additional money was spent for 
improvements on the home. Appellant stated he spent over 
$40,000.00 in improvements on the house. (R-198, L 14-22) The 
figures and references to the record appearing on pages 3 and 4 
of Appellant's. Brief are but paraphrases of Appellant's 
testimony and there was no documentation which would show that 
these monies went for improvements in the home. In addition, 
Appellant's overall credibility was impeached during cross 
examination. (R-184-185) 
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Appellant brought four unimproved lots into the marriage. 
The parties made payments on these lots from their joint 
accounts until they were paid for in 1978. (R-125). No 
independent testimony was presented as to the value of these 
lots, however, Appellant listed them for sale during the 
marriage for a total purchase price of $29,000.00. (R-156) 
Appellant further testified that many of the debts in 
issue were incurred by him subsequent to the parties' 
separation and he agreed to pay these debts. (R-172) 
The Court had earlier entered an Order of Temporary 
Support in Respondent's favor in the amount of $450.00 per 
month. (R-34) Appellant had partially complied with this 
Order by making the second mortgage payments of $345.00 per 
month for 9 months. 
At the close of the evidence, the Trial Court granted 
Respondent a Decree of Divorce and asked that each side submit 
Memoranda setting forth what each felt to be a reasonable 
distribution of assets and liabilities. (R-209) 
During the course of the trial, and in his Memorandum, the 
Appellant and his counsel suggested to the Court that 
Respondent.'s residence not be sold and that Appellant pay the 
second mortgage payments in lieu of alimony and that Appellant 
share in the equity of the home when it was ultimately sold. 
(R-82, 165, 167, 211) Respondent asked only for alimony until 
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the second mortgage was paid. (R-158) 
Respondent also requested an award of attorney's fees of 
$1,530.00 plus $148.00 in costs. (R-159) The Trial Court 
ordered Appellant to pay $1,000.00 towards those fees. (R-103) 
After the Court had entered its Memorandum Decision, 
Appellant objected to the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. (R-85-86) He did not challenge the 
Court's alimony award, or the base amount of Appellant's lien 
on the residence, but only the conditions as to when 
that lien would become due. (R-85) The Trial Court heard the 
objections and modified certain portions of its Decision 
(R-88-92) as requested by Appellant. 
No Motion for New Trial was made and the final Decree of 
Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were 
approved by Appellant's counsel. (R-99, 104) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF A TRIAL COURT 
IN A DIVORCE ACTION SHOULD 
NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THERE IS 
A CLEAR SHOWING OF A MISAPPLitATION 
OF LAW OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
RESULTING IN A SUBSTANTIAL ERROR OR 
SERIOUS INEQUITY. 
Appellant contends that the Trial Court erred in its award 
of alimony and inequitably distributed the marital assets and, 
consequently, abused the wide discretion afforded a Trial Court 
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in making such property distributions and support awards. The 
evidence presented to the Trial Court clearly shows that this 
is just not the case. 
In order to prevail on this Appeal, Appellant is required 
to show that the Trial Court, in making its support award or 
distribution of property, misunderstood or misapplied the law; 
entered Findings not supported by the evidence; or caused a 
serious inequity so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah, 1977). As was 
clearly stated in Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah, 1974): 
Although it is both the duty and prerogative of this 
Court in a case of equity to review the facts as well as 
the law, Article VIII, § 9, Constitution of Utah, the 
Trial Judge has considerable latitude of discretion in 
adjusting the financial and property interests in a 
divorce case. The actions of the Trial Court are indulged 
with the presumption of validity, and the burden is upon 
Appellant to prove such a serious inequity as to manifest 
a clear abuse of discretion. (Footnote) There is no 
fixed formula for the division of property; § 30-3-5 
U.C.A. 1953, provides that when a decree of divorce is 
made, "the Court may make such orders in relation to 
property as may be equitable. (Footnote) Id. at 700. 
Appellant's burden is not an easy one and the record does 
not show in any way an abuse of discretion by the Trial Court. 
As was stated in Sorenson v. Sorenson, 376 P.2d 547 (Utah, 
1963) : 
Unless there is manifest injustice and inequity or a 
clear abuse of discretion, the Court will not substitute 
its judgment for that of the Trial Court. Id. at 548. 
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The Memorandum Decision (R-66) and the Order on 
Defendant's Objection (R-90) reveal that the Trial Court 
carefully considered all of the evidence before it, reviewed 
the suggested positions regarding support and property and 
reached a solution which would not unjustly burden either 
party. In so doing, it fashioned a remedy which provided 
Respondent with sufficient sums to make certain she could keep 
the house she brought into the marriage; gave Appellant a 
substantial increasing interest in that home; and made certain 
that the parties' interest in the New Mexico property would be 
fairly determined and distributed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALIMONY 
AWARD WAS PROPER GIVEN THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PARTIES 
In making its award of alimony, the Trial Court had before 
it the following facts: This was a six-year marriage. (R-93) 
Respondent had been receiving $150.00 per month alimony when 
she married Appellant. (R-141) At the request of Appellant, 
Respondent worked only a short time during the marriage. 
(R-156) At the time of trial, Respondent was employed and 
netting $687.00 per month and Appellant was netting $1,451.67 
per month. (R-95) A second mortgage on the Respondent's home 
had been taken out just prior to separation with monthly 
payments of $345.00. (R-94-95) Appellant had been making that 
8 
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second payment for the nine months the parties had been 
separated; Respondent had requested an award of alimony until 
the second mortgage was paid (R-158); and, Appellant, during 
the trial, suggested on several occasions that he be allowed to 
make the second mortgage payment in lieu of alimony. (R-82, 
167 and 211) 
With these facts before it, the Trial Court, realizing it 
would be unfair to require Respondent and her three children to 
find a new residence with much higher monthly payments, 
considered the disparity in earnings of the parties and ordered 
Appellant to pay $420.00 per month alimony until the second 
mortgage was paid. In so doing, it followed the guidelines set 
forth in Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1979): 
The purpose of alimony is to provide post-marital 
support; it is intended neither as a penalty imposed on 
the husband nor as a reward to the wife. Its function is 
to provide support for the wife as nearly as possible at 
the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and 
to prevent her from becoming a public charge. Important 
criteria in determining a reasonable award for support and 
maintenance are the financial conditions and needs of the 
wife, considering her station in life; her ability to 
produce sufficient income for herself; and the ability of 
the husband to provide support. Id. at 147 (Emphasis 
added, footnote omitted.) 
In this case, the Trial Court recognized the needs of 
Respondent in having sums sufficient to pay the second mortgage 
so that she could continue as best as possible to enjoy at 
least the standard of living she had before and during her 
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marriage to Appellant. It further noted that Appellant earned 
more than twice as much as Respondent, but also that, given the 
circumstances, his obligation to pay alimony .should not 
continue indefinitely. 
Appellant contends in Point I of his Brief that if he is 
required to make the second mortgage payment as a part of his 
alimony obligation, he should receive a reimbursement for the 
amounts which reduce the second mortgage when the home is 
ultimately sold. In essence, Appellant is arguing for the 
concept of "reimbursable alimony." 
In so doing, Appellant has confused and merged the issues 
of alimony and property distribution. Contrary to Appellant's 
claim, an alimony award is separate and distinct from a 
property settlement. As was stated in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 
615 P.2d 1218 (Utah, 1980): 
. There is a distinction between the division of 
assets accumulated during marriage, which are distributed 
upon an equitable basis, and the post-marital duty of 
support and maintenance . . . Id. at 1223. 
The Trial Court recognized that distinction and ordered a 
$420.00 per month alimony payment, the same to end when the 
second mortgage has been paid. That payment is to be made 
directly to Respondent as alimony not as Appellant's 
contribution towards the second mortgage. This is further 
supported by the fact that the Court required the Respondent to 
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assume and pay the second mortgage payment. (R-101) The Court 
then dealt with the property distribution issue and allowed 
Appellant an $11,500.00 lien in the property, plus one-half of 
any increases in the value of the property due to inflation. 
Clearly, then the amount and duration of the alimony award and 
_the determination of Appellant's equity interest in the home 
are separate and distinct from one another and not the least 
bit unreasonable, especially in light of the fact that 
Appellant himself had suggested his amenability to such an 
approach numerous times during the proceedings. (R-82, 167, 
211) 
POINT III 
THE REAL PROPERTY INTERESTS OF 
THE PARTIES WERE PROPERLY 
AND FAIRLY DISTRIBUTED 
It is undisputed that both parties brought property into 
the marriage. Respondent - a home with a mortgage on it, and 
Appellant - 4 real estate lots subject to an unpaid contract 
balance~ During the marriage, each of the parties worked 
together and jointly contributed their time, efforts, and money 
in an attempt to make a successful marriage. (R-125, l~O, 146; 
148 and 156) That attempt failed as is evidenced by this 
action. However, over the course of the marriage, the values 
of this property changed because of payments made, mortgage 
reduction and inflation. Consequently, it is admitted that 
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Appellant has some interest in the residence, while Respondent 
has some interest in the lots. 
The job of the Trial Court was to determine what that 
interest should be, based upon the evidence presented to it. A 
review of the record shows a definite lack of solid evidence of 
the costs of improvements claimed to have been made by 
Appellant on the residence and little evidence other than the 
listing prices on the value of the lots. 
This being the case, the Trial Court did the only 
reasonable thing possible: It looked at the fair market value 
of the home, both at the time of the marriage and at the time 
of trial (Exhibit 1-P), the mortgage balances and the testimony 
of the parties as to improvements and concluded that Appellant, 
indeed, had an interest in the home and that that interest was 
$11,500.00. It is important to note that even though 
Appellant has claimed large contributions towards improvements 
in this home, he provided the Trial Court with nothing (no 
checks, bank statements or receipts) which in any way document 
and support his claim. Further the Trial Court recognized the 
fact that in all fairness, Respondent had a greater interest 
because she brought this asset into the marriage. 
The same analysis was used in the handling of the real 
estate lots. Because Appellant brought this property into the 
marriage, the Court determined he would receive a greater 
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interest (Appellant two-thirds and Respondent one-third) · 
Appellant claims the Trial Court shouldn't have ordered these 
lots sold, but Appellant did not provide the Court with an 
appraisal. Further, given the fact that Respondent, indeed, 
had acquired an interest in this property, the Trial Court had 
no other choice than to require the lots to be sold in the 
market place and thereby give each party his or her just 
portion of the proceeds. The considerable latitude of 
discretion afforded the Trial Court in divorce actions includes 
the power to require the sale of assets to effectuate an 
equitable distribution of the property between the parties. 
Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184 (Utah, 1977). Appellant has 
simply not shown an abuse of discretion in the way the home and 
lots were disposed of by the Trial Court. Accordingly, its 
decision should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's award of alimony was not unfair given 
the length of the marriage, the contribution of each of the 
parties and their respective earning capabilities. Simply 
because Respondent uses a portion of the alimony award to pay 
the second mortgage, does not entitle Appellant to any 
reimbursement of the alimony he is required to pay. The 
property distribution giving Respondent a larger interest in 
the home she brought into the marriage, and the Appellant a 
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larger interest in the lots he brought into the marriage was 
most fair. Appellant has failed to show any abuse of 
discretion or manifest injustice on the part of the Trial Court 
in either the support award or the property distribution. 
Respectfully submitted this /Z day of March, 1982. 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
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